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ABSTRACT 
For more than three decades, the hypothetical constitutional right of informational privacy has 
governed by assumption in the lower courts.  The Supreme Court assumed the right into being in 
two cases decided in 1977, Whalen v. Roe and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 
and persisted in assuming the right exists without deciding recently in NASA v. Nelson.  In the 
fertile murk of indecision, a hodgepodge of standards from interest-balancing all the way up to 
strict scrutiny and a quasi-constitutional law of intuitions have arisen in the lower courts.  What 
constitutes a violation of this assumed right?  The law struggles for a standard to define a 
violation, but we know it when we feel it.   
The Article contends that the very fuzziness of the hypothetical right comes from its nature as an 
affectively saturated moral intuition regarding the proper balance of state and citizen power and 
unease over incursions in times of social change. The Article is also about how to translate the 
powerful moral intuition that the Constitution should have something to say (even if its text does 
not quite say it) when the government does something creepy or outrageous with our intimate 
information into respectable law that helps sort out the manifold meritless claims predicated on 
privacy as knee-jerk reaction rather than right and allows policy innovation in the laboratories of 
states and political branches.  The article argues that privacy is a transitional lens that opens up 
our vision of the liberty and freedoms safeguarded in the Constitution.  We need not invent or 
recognize a new atextual right of informational privacy.  Rather the concept of informational 
privacy is a lens that brings into focus a richer vision of the scope of textually inscribed 
constitutional freedoms and what it means to vindicate them.   
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Like many other desirable things not included in the Constitution, 
“informational privacy” seems like a good idea—wherefore the People have 
enacted laws . . .  restricting the [G]overnment’s collection and use of 
information.  But it is up to the People to enact those laws, to shape them, 
and, when they think it appropriate, to repeal them.  A federal constitutional 
right to “informational privacy” does not exist. 
–Justice Antonin Scalia, concurring in NASA v. Nelson1 
INTRODUCTION 
The hypothetical constitutional right to informational privacy has 
governed by assumption in the lower courts for more than three dec-
ades.  What constitutes a violation of this assumed right?  The law 
struggles to define the metes and bounds of the claimed constitu-
tional right and a standard for when it is transgressed.2  But we know 
it when we feel it.  This Article contends that the very fuzziness of the 
hypothetical right comes from its nature as an affectively saturated 
moral intuition regarding the proper balance of state and citizen 
power and unease over incursions in times of social change.  This Ar-
ticle is also about how to translate into respectable law the powerful 
moral intuition that the Constitution should have something to say 
(even if its text does not quite say it) when the government does 
something creepy or outrageous with our intimate information. 
Beyond assuming the right into being, the Supreme Court has 
never found a violation.3  The three cases where the Court assumed a 
 
 1 131 S. Ct. 746, 764 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 2 See, e.g., In re The Paternity of K.D., 929 N.E.2d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (observing 
that “neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has articulated a precise test for 
an alleged violation of the right to confidentiality or defined the boundaries of that 
right”). 
 3 See Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 751 (assuming without deciding that the Constitution protects 
information privacy but holding that government background checks of NASA contrac-
tors do not violate the assumed right); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 459–
60, 464 (1977) (rejecting President Richard Nixon’s claim that retention of his presiden-
tial papers violated his constitutional right to privacy, explaining that the archive and re-
view of papers served “important national interests” and “less restrictive means” were un-
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hypothetical right to informational privacy did not ring the emotion-
al meters of concern so typical in decisional privacy cases nor give 
much colorable cause to find a violation, even assuming the right ex-
ists.  After thirty-three years of silence, the most recent case involves a 
claim described by Justice Scalia as “utter silliness”—that privacy 
shields NASA government contractors working with very important, 
expensive equipment from routine background checks into drug use 
and treatment.4  The second case, decided in 1977, involved Presi-
dent Richard Nixon suing to prevent the archiving of the Presidential 
papers of his administration because some personal papers may have 
been mixed in and had to be screened out for return.5  Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the Court, was not sympathetic to Nixon, though he 
was sympathetic to the hypothesized right of informational privacy in 
unspecified other (and probably more compelling) contexts.6 
The only case that gave the Court significant pause—and the ge-
nesis of the assumed right—was the earliest case, Whalen v. Roe, also 
decided in 1977, a few months before Nixon.  Whalen involved a New 
York statute that required record-keeping on purchases of certain 
dangerous prescription drugs such as methadone and cocaine.7  
Then, as now, we had a wealth of literature warning that technologi-
cal advances were shaking up the balance of power between citizen 
and the state, enabling the state to maintain vast databases of infor-
mation in creepy fashion.8  The hypothetical right to informational 
 
available to separate out private papers for return); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 
(1977) (explaining that even “[r]ecognizing that in some circumstances” the government 
may “arguably” have a constitutional duty of nondisclosure for certain private informa-
tion, New York’s scheme for surveilling the identity of persons purchasing prescription 
medicines did not run afoul of “any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment” (emphasis added)). 
 4 Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 769 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 5 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 430–32, 459. 
 6 See infra Part I. 
 7 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591, 604–05.  Cocaine, a drug currently considered such a scourge 
that it is subject to mandatory minima when distributed even in low quantities, used to be 
available by prescription.  Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II) (2006) (setting ten-
year mandatory minimum for possessing five kilograms or more of cocaine) with 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) (2006) (providing that the ten-year mandatory minimum is 
not triggered for marijuana unless 1000 kilograms or more are distributed). 
 8 Compare, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:  COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, 
AND DOSSIERS 43 (1971) (arguing that more than any other time in our history, Ameri-
cans (back then, already) were being pervasively monitored and their electronic foot-
prints tracked and stored because of advances in modern technology) and Vern Coun-
tryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy:  The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEX. L. 
REV. 837, 839–47, 853–62 (1971) (expressing concern over the rise of privately compiled 
and governmentally compiled digital dossiers) with, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN 
CONTEXT:  TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 21–55 (2010) (theo-
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privacy arose out of the intuition that there ought to be limits, 
though they had not been overstepped yet.  The Whalen Court con-
cluded its opinion dismissing the claims of opiate buyers with “a final 
word about issues we have not decided,” noting “[w]e are not una-
ware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast 
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or oth-
er massive government files.”9 
In the lower courts, where the right has flourished by assumption 
over the decades, however, potential violations have been found, 
most frequently in cases of alleged abuses of official power that regis-
ter high on the outrage or creepiness emotional meter.  Examples in-
clude law enforcement officials aggressively outing HIV-positive 
people and trying to get them fired or harming their familial rela-
tions and the ability of their children to attend school;10 or threaten-
ing to disclose a teenager’s gay sexual orientation to his grandfather 
after arresting him for suspected underage drinking, causing the 
youth to commit suicide;11 or “gratuitously and unnecessarily” releas-
ing humiliating details of a rape for no other purpose than to reta-
liate against the rape victim for criticizing an ineffectual investiga-
 
rizing a context-sensitive approach to curtailing the reach and threat of vast and deep in-
formation databases); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK:  THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 13, 169–86 (2007) (proposing solutions to 
rein in the technologically abetted surveillance state); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON:  TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 8–9, 13–28, 43–46 (2004) 
(theorizing the threat posed by the rise of aggregated and commercialized public record 
information dissemination); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1461, 1472–1501 (2000) (illuminating the threat to privacy posed by the routinization of 
information collection and the regularization of privacy-destroying technologies). 
 9 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. 
 10 See, e.g., Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1172–73, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding a 
potential violation where a probation officer tried to get a probationer fired from his job 
at a café because she believed an HIV-positive person should not be in a food-preparation 
position, but holding that the right was not clearly established at the time for purposes of 
vitiating qualified immunity); A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(noting there is a constitutional right against information disclosure in a case where a po-
lice officer discovered a positive HIV test result in plaintiff’s wallet and told his sister, 
housemates, and others, causing friends and family to shun the plaintiff); Doe v. Borough 
of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 378–79, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding a violation of the 
constitutional right to information privacy in a civil suit against a police officer who 
learned about the plaintiff’s husband’s seropositive HIV status during a traffic stop and 
proceeded to track down the plaintiff’s neighbors, to tell them of his HIV status—
information that spread to the school of plaintiff’s children where some parents withdrew 
their children and complained to the media). 
 11 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a police 
officer’s assertion of qualified immunity due to factual insufficiency was not recognizable 
in an interlocutory appeal of a civil suit). 
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tion;12 or keeping a sex videotape featuring an extortion victim in a 
desk drawer and allegedly viewing it, inviting other officers to view it, 
and reproducing it for personal gratification rather than any public 
purpose.13  The hypothetical right is so powerful that it has sometimes 
overridden qualified immunity and been deemed “clearly estab-
lished” despite the Supreme Court’s persistent eschewal of clearly re-
cognizing, much less establishing, any such right.14 
After the Court again ducked on deciding whether the right that 
has flourished in the lower courts even exists, Justice Scalia wrote a 
vigorous concurrence listing the harms of nondecision, including:  
(1) an “Alfred Hitchcock line” of jurisprudence based on a coy as-
sumption that gives the Court cover to pontificate about privacy when 
it has no business further opining for lack of a constitutional right to 
vindicate; (2) the harm to the Court’s image, and perhaps its self-
respect, done by the jurisprudential incoherence of trying to define a 
hypothetical standard to govern a hypothetical right; (3) the lack of 
guidance to lower courts; and (4) the risk of a dramatic increase in 
the number of lawsuits asserting violations of the right to informa-
tional privacy that, though meritless, are “slightly less absurd” then 
the Nelson claimants’ and therefore will drain judicial resources for 
no good reason.15  The assumption has persisted for more than three 
decades and the sky has not fallen, Justice Alito, for the majority, 
wrote back in wry rejoinder.16  True enough, and the exchange makes 
for lively reading. 
But even if the sky has not fallen, the approach of regulation by 
fog and assumption has costs beyond even those Justice Scalia enu-
merated.  This Article argues that the additional harms include the 
risk of chilling policy innovations by the political branches and an in-
ability to, and an inconsistency in, separating out or even defining 
meritorious claims from the vast pool of chaff that should be rapidly 
sorted out at the threshold.  The courts—including the Supreme 
 
 12 Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 686–87 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a “cognizable” violation of 
the right to privacy but not of a clearly established constitutional right sufficient to vitiate 
qualified immunity, though warning that “public officials in this circuit will now be on no-
tice that such a privacy right exists”). 
 13 James v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1540–41, 1544 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding a viola-
tion of “a clearly established constitutional right [to privacy]” in light of a breach of the 
duty of confidentiality and a promise of discretion in exchange for cooperation in an ar-
son investigation). 
 14 See infra Parts II and III. 
 15 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 766–69 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 16 Id. at 756 n.10 (“[T]here is no evidence that those decisions have caused the sky to fall.”). 
958 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
Court—have wavered and seesawed between flexible reasonableness 
interest-balancing all the way up to what looks like strict scrutiny.17 
It is high time to call out the assumption for the hazy moral intui-
tion that it is and situate the moral intuition in law, and as law, inso-
far as it is supportable.  Resting a protection—even a hazy hypotheti-
cal protection—on a moral intuition is dangerous from a pragmatic 
as well as principled perspective.  Moral intuitions are akin to “naïve 
theories” and heuristics—error-prone and intuition-guided generali-
zations—that suffer from the manifold cognitive biases identified in 
the judgment and decision making literature.18  Status quo bias is an 
example of a cognitive bias with the potential to chill policy innova-
tions if we persist in an intuitive, feels-wrong approach to determin-
ing violations.19  New ideas rouse vague feelings of unease and dis-
quiet because they disrupt the status quo, to which we are intuitively 
attached.  We cannot always trust and use as a guide the affective 
sense that a particular policy seems disquieting in the change it 
wreaks.  Moreover, inability to distinguish the chaff risks demeaning 
an important guide and principle for understanding what the liberty 
explicitly safeguarded by the Constitution means. 
This Article argues that the work of privacy as a constitutional 
concept is to adapt the idea of liberty in times of social change.  Inso-
far as constitutionally relevant, the idea of informational privacy helps 
further define, and should be informed by, the freedoms safeguarded 
in the Constitution, such as the protections for liberty under proce-
dural and substantive due process.  There is a principled reason for 
distinguishing between the cases of HIV and sexual orientation out-
ings by the state with the aim of marring employment, family, and 
friendships and cases where state employees want a job representing 
an important public trust but do not want to get drug tested like the 
rest of us.  And it is more than the crude rule of thumb that we know 
a violation when we feel it. 
 
 17 Compare Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977) (balancing an invasion 
of privacy with the public interest) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–39 (1967)), with Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (writing that broad dissemination of medical informa-
tion “would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presum-
ably be justified only by compelling state interests” (citations omitted)), and Mangels v. 
Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying strict scrutiny).  But see Nelson, 131 S. 
Ct. at 759–60 (balancing interests and rejecting necessity standard). 
 18 See Jonathan Baron, A Psychological View of Moral Intuition, 5 HARV. REV. PHIL., 36, 36–39 
(1995) (explaining that moral intuitions are heuristics and are akin to naïve theories vul-
nerable to cognitive biases and resultant errors and thus cannot be “the royal road to 
moral truth”). 
 19 See infra Part II. 
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This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I analyzes the role of 
privacy as a constitutional concept that helps calibrate the balance of 
power between citizen and state—and the space for liberty—amid so-
cial change.  This Part argues that privacy’s power is its ability to 
hedge and gesture to many different constitutional interests, particu-
larly liberty, thus allowing transition in vision to a richer conception 
of liberty.  Part II argues that the fog of standards surrounding the 
amorphous assumed right of informational privacy points to the need 
to translate into law the fuzzy moral intuitions surrounding the con-
stitutional right.  Part III explains how to translate our intuitions 
about the right to informational privacy into respectable constitu-
tional law that can better help screen out the manifold meritless 
claims predicated on privacy as a knee-jerk reaction to any change in 
the status quo rather than right and permit space for policy innova-
tion by the political branches. 
I.  LIBERTY’S PRECURSOR:  PRIVACY, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE 
BALANCE OF POWER 
Constitutional privacy law’s rapid growth in the twentieth century 
demonstrates its plasticity and power in giving the judiciary a role in 
managing the balance of power between citizen and state amid social 
change.  The affectively saturated prismatic concept of privacy has 
been a vehicle for expressing and sometimes vindicating our yearning 
for judicial intervention to curb the encroaching state, particularly in 
times of social change.  The jurisprudence of decisional privacy took 
root in a time of social change in our sexual mores.  The shadow juri-
sprudence of informational privacy that is still fumbling to take root 
emerged and continues to unfurl in a time of disquiet over the shift-
ing power and role of the state in an information society.  The con-
cept of privacy is powerful in times of change precisely because of its 
prismatic nature to suggest an array of potential rationales during a 
transitional moment regarding the full scope and nature of rights. 
A. Decisional Privacy and Shifting Sexual Mores and Technologies 
The first concept of constitutionalized privacy to take root arose 
to calibrate the proper balance between the citizen and the state 
amid changes in social mores and technological advances that the Fa-
cebook and sexting generation takes for granted—sexual liberation 
and contraception.  Sexual mores were in rapid evolution in the late 
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1960s and 1970s.20  Chemical engineers had braved the disdain of the 
scientific community for the “disreputable” line of research into birth 
control and the prospect of religious boycotts and succeeded in de-
veloping hormonal contraceptives, bringing birth control under 
women’s control and a matter of planning removed from the sex 
act.21  Activists were advocating for autonomy outside the constraints 
of traditional forms of marriage, motherhood, and the nuclear fami-
ly.22 
To gain a toehold and open up the transition in this time of fo-
ment, decisional privacy law got its start in the guise of safeguarding a 
certain kind of sexual autonomy—that of the husband and wife.  In 
the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut, finding a right to privacy 
in the “penumbras” of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments was about the right of a married couple to seek contra-
ceptive advice.23  At the outset of the opinion, Justice Douglas unders-
cored in italics that this was a case about counseling “married persons” 
about contraceptive devices and the challenged law criminalizing use 
of a contraceptive device or aiding and abetting such use “operates 
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife.”24  He ruled that 
the doctors prosecuted for providing advice had standing “to raise 
the constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a 
professional relationship,” reasoning that otherwise “[t]he rights of 
husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely 
affected.”25  The model of monogamy was such a strong shaper of the 
opinion that Justice Douglas reiterated that this case was about the 
right of the “married” seven times.26 
Nowhere did the generally applicable criminal law target merely 
married people.  The challenged laws applied to “[a]ny person.”27  
 
 20 See Norval D. Glenn & Charles N. Weaver, Attitudes Toward Premarital, Extramarital, and 
Homosexual Relations in the U.S. in the 1970s, 15 J. SEX RES. 108, 111–12, 117–18 (1979) 
(examining the liberalization of American attitudes toward sexual relations). 
 21 See Claudia Flavell-While, Engineering the Sexual Revolution, CHEMICAL ENGINEER, June 
2010, at 46, 47 (“The sexual revolution would have been impossible without a method of 
contraception that was under the woman’s control and divorced from the sex act.”). 
 22 See John Leo, The Revolution Is Over, TIME, Apr. 9, 1984, at 74, 77 (discussing previously 
popular activities of the Sexual Revolution). 
 23 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 24 Id. at 480, 482. 
 25 Id. at 481. 
 26 Id. at 480–86. 
 27 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958) (“Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or 
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dol-
lars Or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and 
imprisoned.”); id. at § 54-196 (“Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or 
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But in the bold move of birthing a constitutional right to privacy, Jus-
tice Douglas took pains to portray the protection as about the intima-
cies of married life.  In justifying the recognition of a right found no-
where explicitly in the Constitution, Justice Douglas analogized to 
prior protection of the intimacies of family life.  He first invoked 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which had recognized the parental right to 
determine how to educate one’s children.28  He concluded by wrap-
ping the newborn privacy right in the mantle of preserving the sacro-
sanct marital relationship: 
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is re-
pulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than 
our political parties, older than our school system.  Marriage is a coming 
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the 
degree of being sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, 
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not 
commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an association for as noble a pur-
pose as any involved in our prior decisions.29 
Concurring, Justice Goldberg, writing for Justices Warren and Bren-
nan, further characterized the unconstitutional intrusion as “upon 
the right of marital privacy,” bringing the state into “the marital rela-
tion and the marital home.”30  He allied this notion of “marital priva-
cy” with “the right . . . to marry, establish a home, and bring up child-
ren.”31  The constitutional right to privacy would be a respectable 
monogamous one, closely allied to the autonomy of familial deci-
sions—albeit perhaps a nascent one that wanted to exercise a little 
control in determining when the family would come into being.  It 
was forged on the notion, earlier laid down in the childrearing au-
tonomy cases of Pierce and Meyer v. Nebraska, that there is a “private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”32 
In this ode to marriage and the import of preserving the privacy 
and intimacy of the marital relationship, nowhere was there mention 
of the liberties of the libertines having sex outside marriage.  The 
Court was on the cusp of the “sexual revolution” that began in the 
 
commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were 
the principal offender.”). 
 28 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (cited in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482). 
 29 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. 
 30 Id. at 486, 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 31 Id. at 486, 488 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 32 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
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“swinging 60s”—but not quite there yet.33  In the hang-ups and han-
gover of the straitlaced 1950s, premarital and extramarital sex were 
frowned upon severely.  Opinion polls in 1937 and 1959 reveal stabili-
ty in negative attitudes toward premarital sex, with a majority of 55% 
in 1937 and a majority of 54% in 1959 of people surveyed in a Roper 
Poll indicating they did not believe it was acceptable for parties to a 
marriage to have had previous sexual experience.34  The notion that 
parties to a marriage be virgins seems quite remarkable today.  Gris-
wold left unclear whether the interests of the silent fraction of such 
sexually active people were to be sub silentio left outside the scope of 
the newly delineated privacy right.  The Court did not answer the 
question definitively until seven years later, in the 1972 case of Eisens-
tadt v. Baird.35 
By the end of the 1960s, premarital sex had come out of the 
cloisters full-swing.  Public opinion surveys indicate that approval of 
premarital sex had begun rising in the 1960s and even out-of-wedlock 
children had gained widespread acceptance by 1970.36  In 1969, a ma-
jority of people surveyed in a Gallup Poll—68.8%—still thought pre-
marital sex was wrong but by 1973 this view had dropped to 47%.37  
Approval of sex education in schools had been rising since the 1960s 
and by the 1970s approval of teaching teens about birth control be-
gan rising, “reaching an approval level of more than 85%” by the 
1980s.38  The rise in sexual permissiveness was cutting across racial, 
class, and geographic lines and becoming a national cultural pheno-
menon.39 
In April 1967, the spring of the year some view as the start of the 
sexual revolution,40 William R. Baird gave a lecture by invitation to 
two thousand Boston University students about the relative merits of 
 
 33 See, e.g., Karl King et al., The Continuing Premarital Sexual Revolution Among College Females, 
39 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 455, 455 (1977) (stating the “premarital sexual revolution” began 
in the late 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s); Tom W. Smith, The Sexual Revolution?, 54 
PUB. OPINION Q. 415, 415 (1990) (reviewing media coverage and concluding that the 
mass media “discovered” the sexual revolution in 1963–1964 and the revolution began in 
the early 1960s). 
 34 Smith, supra note 33, at 421. 
 35 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 36 Smith, supra note 33, at 416–17. 
 37 Id. at 422. 
 38 Id. at 418. 
 39 See B. K. Singh, Trends in Attitudes Toward Premarital Sexual Relations, 42 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 387, 391 (1980) (discussing increasingly positive attitudes toward premarital sexual 
relations across these population categories). 
 40 See, e.g., Erica Jong, Foreword to SEXUAL REVOLUTION, xxxvii (Jefferey Escoffier ed., 2003) 
(marking 1967 as the start of the sexual revolution). 
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various forms of contraception.41  He used various kinds of contracep-
tives as exhibits and after the lecture invited students up to help 
themselves to the contraceptives.42  After he handed an “unmarried 
adult woman a package of vaginal foam” he was arrested for violating 
a felony provision of Massachusetts law criminalizing exhibiting or 
giving away contraception-averting devices, drugs, or medicines.43  Af-
ter Griswold, the law had an exception for physicians and pharmacists 
dispensing contraceptives to married persons but Baird was not a 
physician or pharmacist and the student was unmarried.44  The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court had read Griswold to mean that privacy sur-
rounds the marital relationship—but the state remained free to regu-
late the “sexual lives of single persons” because of the legitimate state 
interest in “discouraging . . . extra-marital relations.”45 
Reviewing Baird’s federal habeas petition, the First Circuit ad-
dressed the anomaly allowing state interference in the sexual lives of 
unmarried but not married persons in ringing terms, making the is-
sue one of “human rights”: 
To say that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden 
to unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist in having intercourse, 
means that such persons must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnan-
cy, for the child, illegitimacy, and for society, a possible obligation of 
support.  Such a view of morality is not only the very mirror image of 
sensible legislation; we consider that it conflicts with fundamental human 
rights.46 
Though noting the First Circuit’s ringing language, the Supreme 
Court hedged47 and took a more conservative course, couching its de-
cision upholding the right to contraception for the unmarried in the 
logic of symmetry of rights and equal protection rationality between 
the married and unmarried.48 
 
 41 Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Mass. 1969). 
 42 Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1399 (1st Cir. 1970). 
 43 Id. at 1399 & n.1 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 21 (1992)). 
 44 Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d at 1399 n.1. 
 45 Sturgis v. Att’y Gen., 260 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Mass. 1970). 
 46 Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d at 1402. 
 47 See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 475–
78 (2010) (terming the analytical move in which the boundaries between the chosen ba-
sis of decision and a secondary rationale as “hedging”); see also Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial 
Proxies:  Resurgent State and Local Anti-“Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for Antidi-
scrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 935 (2011) (noting that hedging “may plant 
the seeds of an alternate rationale to blossom later, when the transition has been eased 
with an approach that has a broader base of support at the time”). 
 48 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (explaining that “whatever the rights of the 
individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmar-
ried and the married alike”). 
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The newfound privacy right blossomed to fuller power and scope 
a year later in Roe v. Wade.49  In Roe, women came out as plaintiffs to 
speak for themselves.50  Two of the plaintiffs, Marsha and David King, 
renamed Mary and John Doe, fit the married couple paradigm famil-
iar from the victory in Griswold v. Connecticut.51  The third plaintiff, 
however, Norma McCorvey, represented the changing times and 
needs—she was unmarried, pregnant, twenty-one years old and had 
already given birth to two children and relinquished both.52 
The landmark privacy case of Roe v. Wade was decided under 
Norma McCorvey’s pseudonym Jane Roe.  Roe’s case challenged a 
Texas statute that dated to 1857 and barred all abortions unless ne-
cessary to save the woman’s life.53  In Roe, the right to privacy that got 
its early start arising from the sanctities and intimacies of the marital 
relationship in Griswold54 morphed into something with much broad-
er promise for the autonomy of all women, including unmarried 
young pregnant women like Norma McCorvey: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as 
we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amend-
ment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass 
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.  The de-
triment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by deny-
ing this choice altogether is apparent. . . . Maternity, or additional 
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.  Psy-
chological harm may be imminent.  Mental and physical health may be 
taxed by child care.  There is also the distress, for all concerned, asso-
ciated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a 
child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care 
for it.  In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and con-
tinuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.55 
Privacy had dramatically grown and changed posture to meet the 
changes and new social needs of the 1960s and 1970s women’s rights 
and sexual revolutions. 
 
 49 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 50 See id. at 120 (describing plaintiff Jane Roe, “a single woman” who “wished to terminate 
her pregnancy”). 
 51 See id. at 121 (introducing Mary and Jane Doe); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) 
(categorizing the appellants as a married couple); LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, 
BEFORE ROE V. WADE:  VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT’S RULING 3–4, 22–25, 224 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2010) (ex-
plaining the motivations and history behind the national effort to legalize the provision 
of abortions). 
 52 GREENHOUSE & SIEGEL, supra note 51, at 224. 
 53 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117–18. 
 54 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–86. 
 55 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
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Privacy is a transitional lens that helps us view liberty in a new 
light.  It also helps in facilitating what Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai 
have termed “hedging.”56  Hedging involves the blurring between a 
palette of possible rationales to build consensus and plant the seeds 
of alternate rationales when social support for a decision is uncertain 
or rocky.57  The power of privacy as a transitional concept stems from 
what is often portrayed as its greatest embarrassment—its ability to 
gesture at and arise from different constitutional values and its “pro-
tean capacity to be all things to all lawyers.”58  A privacy rationale con-
tains within it multiple potential avenues of rationales and implants a 
proliferation—some might say confusion—of seeds with potential to 
blossom.59 
After breaking ground, the idea of decisional privacy is discreetly 
slipping off stage and liberty is coming to the forefront.  Jamal 
Greene would go further—he recently pronounced the demise of 
constitutional privacy and the ascendancy of liberty as the operative 
rationale for anchoring privacy’s enduring contributions to constitu-
tional law, pointing to Lawrence v. Texas60 as the “mortal blow.”61  In 
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, invalidated a Tex-
as law criminalizing same-sex sodomy on substantive due process 
grounds, to vindicate the liberty secured by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.62  Almost entirely eschewing the privacy 
language prominent in Bowers v. Hardwick,63 including Justice White’s 
famously curt rejection of the idea that the “right of priva-
cy . . . extends to homosexual sodomy,”64 Justice Kennedy instead un-
derscored that much deeper autonomy interests were at stake.65  He 
wrote eloquently: 
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain 
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it 
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply 
about the right to have sexual intercourse.  The laws involved in Bowers 
and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohi-
 
 56 Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 47, at 475–78. 
 57 Id. at 475–76. 
 58 Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977). 
 59 See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1448 (1992) 
(noting “the penumbral justification” is “much-maligued [sic]”). 
 60 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 61 Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 729–30 (2010). 
 62 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 573–74. 
 63 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
 64 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
 65 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy 
for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”). 
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bit a particular sexual act.  Their penalties and purposes, though, have 
more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human con-
duct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.  The statutes 
do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without 
being punished as criminals.66 
Privacy may have stepped off center stage, but that was because it had 
done its work in opening up the vision of liberty to include the 
shared value of autonomy and space from the state to make auto-
nomous decisions.  Privacy was a lens that opened up the Court’s vi-
sion to the autonomy interest at stake and the impairment of liberty 
when the State seeks to impinge on “the most private human con-
duct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”67 
B.  Informational Privacy and the Management of Information as Power 
From its start, informational privacy was linked to decisional pri-
vacy from the common concern of state interference with autonomy 
of choice.  In the foundational case that assumed a right to informa-
tional privacy, Whalen v. Roe, patients with opiate prescriptions sued 
over a New York law requiring collection of identity data on purchas-
ers of certain potentially dangerous prescription drugs such as co-
caine and methadone.68  The patients argued that they feared the 
computerized data, despite safeguards, would be misused and that 
they would “be stigmatized as drug addicts.”69  The patients con-
tended that the “mere existence . . . of the information” about their 
use of the drugs roused fear that the information may become public 
and hurt their reputations, rendering them “reluctant to use, and 
some doctors reluctant to prescribe, such drugs even when their use 
is medically indicated.”70  While the patients apparently conceived of 
decisional privacy and informational privacy as separate headings of 
rights, the Court’s characterization of their argument shows the 
shared concern was interference with their autonomy choice. 
The linkage between privacy and autonomy is explicit in District 
Court Judge Robert L. Carter’s learned opinion, which explained: 
The concept of privacy is an affirmation of the importance of certain as-
pects of the individual and his desired freedom from needless outside in-
terference.  It is sometimes described as a sphere of space that a man may 
 
 66 Id. at 567 (emphasis added). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593, 595 (1977). 
 69 Id. at 595 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70 Id. at 600. 
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carry with him which is protected from unwarranted outside intrusion, as 
the right of selected disclosures about oneself and as a right of personal 
autonomy.71 
Judge Carter was influenced by Louis Henkin’s article Privacy and Au-
tonomy.  Henkin argued that privacy was a misnomer for what the 
Court was recognizing.72  Henkin explained that “[w]hat the Supreme 
Court has given us, rather, is something essentially different and 
farther-reaching, an additional zone of autonomy.”73  As Amitai Et-
zioni has illuminated, privacy’s connotation of “exemption from scru-
tiny” heavily influenced by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s ca-
nonical The Right to Privacy74 is different from the Court’s 
constitutional privacy jurisprudence, which is about “exemption from 
control by the State.”75  Whalen shows why we might care about informa-
tion disclosure and informational privacy as a constitutional matter—
because of the potential impingement on liberty of choice.76 
The potential impingement the Whalen plaintiffs alleged was spe-
culative and indirect, however, because it was based on the potential 
for data misuse—even though the statute had safeguards, including 
criminalization of public disclosure of the identity of patients and 
limits on who could access the database and for what purposes.77  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, while doctors had helped pioneer the deci-
sional privacy cases in the contraception and abortion context, the 
medical profession’s support of this informational privacy claim was 
lukewarm.  The section on psychiatry of the New York State Medical 
Society apparently declined to support the suit though other physi-
cians’ associations joined.78  Ultimately, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the New York data-gathering program did not “pose a 
sufficiently grievous threat to either [decisional or informational pri-
vacy] . . . to establish a constitutional violation.”79  The Court noted 
 
 71 Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing Louis Henkin, Privacy and 
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419, 1424–26 (1974)). 
 72 Henkin, supra note 71, at 1410–11. 
 73 Id. at 1411. 
 74 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 75 Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Perspective on Privacy, 32 CONN. L. REV. 897, 897 (2000). 
 76 Cf. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 555 (2006) (noting that 
“Whalen illustrates how decisional interference relates to disclosure” and “how decisional 
interference bears similarities to increased accessibility, since the existence of informa-
tion in a government database can increase the potential accessibility of that informa-
tion”). 
 77 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594–95 (1977) (noting that “[w]illful violation of these 
prohibitions” against public disclosure was “punishable by up to one year in prison and a 
$2,000 fine”). 
 78 Id. at 595 n.16. 
 79 Id. at 600. 
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that “an essential part of modern medical practice” involved health 
information disclosures to public health agencies among other enti-
ties and cited as an example venereal disease reporting require-
ments.80 
The District Court had invalidated the New York program on the 
ground that while it served a legitimate purpose, the scheme had “a 
needlessly broad sweep” in identifying patients to prevent people 
from amassing drugs to distribute illegally.81  In twenty months of op-
eration, only one such case of a patient potentially going from doctor 
to doctor to amass drugs had been identified.82  The court concluded 
the yield was too small for the privacy price paid (neglecting that 
benefits cannot just be denominated in transgressors caught because, 
for example, cost-effective deterrence at the outset may also be a 
benefit).83  The Supreme Court read the district court as imposing a 
necessity requirement and underscored that there is no longer such 
requirement.84  “State legislation which has some effect on individual 
liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because a 
court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part,” the Court observed.85  
The Court also reiterated its frequent recognition “that individual 
States have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to 
problems of vital local concern.”86  The Court thus demonstrated 
concern at the outset in its informational privacy jurisprudence that 
policy innovation among the States and political branches not be 
chilled. 
The Court concluded the prospect of harmful disclosure the 
plaintiffs imagined was simply too remote and speculative.  There was 
no support for the “assumption that the security provisions [regard-
ing the data would] . . . be administered improperly” and there was 
only a “remote possibility” that judicially supervised evidentiary use of 
the information might “provide inadequate protection against un-
warranted disclosures.”87  The Court also observed that the case was 
weak because there was no indication “that any individual has been 
deprived of the right to decide independently, with the advice of his 
 
 80 Id. at 602 & n.29. 
 81 Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.  Cf. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598 n.21 (“The absence of detected violations does not, of 
course, demonstrate that a statute has no significant deterrent effect.”). 
 84 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 596–97. 
 85 Id. at 597. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 601–02. 
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physician, to acquire and to use needed medication.”88  This was not a 
case where “the State require[s] access to these drugs to be condi-
tioned on the consent of any state official or other third party.”89  Any 
autonomy impingement was thus insufficiently substantial.  Whalen 
therefore concluded “neither the immediate nor the threatened im-
pact of the patient-identification requirements . . . is sufficient to con-
stitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”90 
If the claim of impingement was so insubstantial, why did it give 
the Court such pause?  The Whalen Court’s concluding caveat both 
sketched the potential right of informational privacy and explained 
what roused the Court’s concern.  Part IV of the Court’s opinion was:  
“A final word about issues we have not decided.”91  The Court wrote:  
“We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumu-
lation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data 
banks or other massive government files.”92  Noting the modern ad-
ministrative state collected masses of data for an array of public pur-
poses, from taxes, to welfare, to criminal justice and national security, 
the Court observed that the power to collect data was “typically ac-
companied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
unwarranted disclosures.”93  In an oft-cited sentence that has become 
the foundation for the assumed right to informational privacy, the 
Court concluded:  “Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty 
arguably has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New York’s sta-
tutory scheme, and its implementing administrative procedures, evi-
dence a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual’s in-
terest in privacy.”94 
Even back then, in the dawning of the information society, com-
mentators were warning about the encroachment on liberty posed by 
government data aggregation and the threat of disclosure.  The 
Court cited work by Arthur Miller arguing that while government da-
ta aggregation often serves salutary public purposes, the dark side is 
monitoring of lawful dissidence and civil rights organizations such as 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
 
 88 Id. at 603. 
 89 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603. 
 90 Id. at 603–04. 
 91 Id. at 605. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. (emphasis added). 
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(“NAACP”) and the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”).95  Mil-
ler was worried that such surveillance of lawful activities would chill 
freedom of expression because of fear the information could be used 
to harm or harass.96  Legislators and scholars of the era were worried 
that the rise of digital dossiers were “an invitation to a police state or 
return to McCarthyism.”97 
Under bombardment over its controversial decisional privacy opi-
nions, the Court was not ready to engraft a new constitutional privacy 
arm.  Justice Stevens’ opinion for the majority hedging on the issue 
left room to vindicate visions on either extremes, neatly captured by 
the two concurring justices:  Justice Brennan, a supporter of strong 
strict scrutiny protection against unwarranted broad dissemination of 
information and Justice Stewart, who opposed the notion of even the 
existence of any such right.98  Whalen is written cryptically enough that 
it can be read by learned individuals as either explicitly recognizing a 
constitutional right to informational privacy or stopping short of 
doing so.99 
Concurring in Whalen, Justice Brennan argued that broad disse-
mination by state officials of medical information “would clearly im-
plicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presuma-
bly be justified only by compelling state interests.”100  Whalen was 
decided in late February 1977.  By the spring, in late June of the same 
year, the Court issued another informational privacy decision, Nixon 
v. Administrator of General Services.101  This time, Justice Brennan was 
writing for the majority.  Amid the mishmash of standards and lan-
guage in Nixon, what becomes clear is that Justice Brennan had to 
stitch together different visions to make his majority on the issue of 
 
 95 Arthur R. Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy:  An Overview, 4 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (1972); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 n.34 (citing Arthur Miller). 
 96 Miller, supra note 95, at 5–6. 
 97 Id. at 6; see Countryman, supra note 8, at 853–56 (noting the FBI’s surveillance and data 
compiling activities).  See generally Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of 
Rights Before the S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d 
Cong. at 61–68 (1971) (expressing concerns over police surveillance). 
 98 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606–07 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 608–09 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). 
 99 Compare, e.g., Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984) (reading Whalen 
and Nixon as “explicitly recogniz[ing] that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses 
an ‘individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’” (quoting Whalen, 429 
U.S. at 599)) with William J. Winslade & Judith Wilson Ross, Privacy, Confidentiality, and 
Autonomy in Psychotherapy, 64 NEB. L. REV. 578, 598 (1985) (reading Whalen as “stop[ping] 
short of recognizing a constitutional right in informational privacy”). 
100 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–
56 (1973)). 
101 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
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whether there is a right to informational privacy and what standard 
applies. 
Nixon involved a suit by President Richard Nixon over legislation 
directing an executive official to take custody of his Presidential pa-
pers and tape recordings.102  Among a grab bag of arguments, Nixon 
claimed a right against disclosure of private information.  He argued 
that private papers were mixed in the collection, and archival screen-
ing to determine what should be returned violated the right.103  Writ-
ing for the majority in dismissing Nixon’s informational privacy 
claim, Justice Brennan cited the flexible interest-balancing standard 
from the Fourth Amendment administrative search and Terry stop 
context.104  He wrote that the “test” was that “any intrusion must be 
weighed against the public interest in subjecting the Presidential ma-
terials . . . to archival screening.”105 
Despite citing the government-deferential interest-balancing cases 
from the Fourth Amendment context in defining his test, however, 
Justice Brennan’s analysis of the facts of the case also used language 
that drew on terms reminiscent of intermediate or strict scrutiny.  He 
concluded that “the archival review procedure involved here is de-
signed to serve important national interests . . . and the unavailability 
of less restrictive means necessarily follows from the commingling of 
the documents.”106  This blur of language may seem puzzling but it 
was artful in that it planted a hook for potential strict scrutiny for the 
fledgling twilight right brought into being that year. 
Nixon’s case may seem a rather ironic one for the development of 
a potential right of informational privacy against the surveillance 
state disrupting the balance of power.  He was, after all, the embodi-
ment of the State obsessed with amassing information in stealth and 
thereby aggregating power.  Indeed, one is reminded of the irony of 
the National Socialists on trial after World War II arguing that their 
criminal prosecution violated the nullum crimen sine lege principle—
the idea that there can be no crime and punishment without preex-
isting law—when the National Socialists famously believed in the 
principle of nullum crimen sine poena—no crime without punish-
 
102 Id. at 429, 459. 
103 Id. at 459. 
104 Id. at 458 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 534–39 (1967)). 
105 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.  
106 Id. at 464. 
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ment.107  There was also a metaphoric power, however, to using Nix-
on’s case as a vehicle for planting the seeds of the protection.  After 
Watergate, the alarmist and seemingly somewhat paranoid vision of 
the State amassing information to cement power and control seems a 
lot less alarmist and paranoid.  Rather, it brings into focus the risks 
posed by information aggregation and why informational privacy may 
be something a democracy and its central charter defining and cali-
brating the proper balance of power should care about. 
II.  THE FOG OF INDECISION:  ON INTUITIONS AND EMOTIONS VERSUS 
LAW 
In producing decisions that could not quite decide if the constitu-
tional right exists and offering a Rorschach blot of standards that 
might govern if it did, the Court punted to the lower courts to sort 
things out.  The lower courts do not have the luxury of sifting and 
carefully choosing where to grant certiorari.  The coy suggestion that 
a right exists without clarification has led to informational privacy 
claims in a spate of suits challenging such socially useful policies as 
financial disclosure requirements for government workers and legis-
lators to prevent corruption,108 or for officers, directors, and share-
holders of taxi corporations to ensure sufficient funds in the event of 
liability for serious injury,109 and background checks for police offic-
ers to ensure mental stability.110  It has also been used to challenge 
highly popular policies addressing serious public concerns and dan-
gers such as sex offender proximity information under Megan’s 
Law,111 and routine basic practices such as requiring bankruptcy fil-
 
107 See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, ON THE THREE TYPES OF JURISTIC THOUGHT 93 (Joseph W. Be-
dersky trans., 2004) (arguing that “the bold and imaginatively endowed criminal” could 
rely on “the phrase nulla poena sine lege” to render the Rechtsstaat a “laughingstock”). 
108 See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558–59 (2d Cir. 1983) (addressing govern-
ment workers’ privacy rights in the context of financial disclosure policies); Plante v. 
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978) (confronting the question of the extent of 
the privacy rights state senators enjoy in the face of financial disclosure requirements). 
109 Statharos v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 198 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1999) (seeking 
a preliminary injunction to bar financial disclosure requirements “promulgated by the 
New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission”). 
110 Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 
1987) (challenging the constitutionality of a questionnaire promulgated by the Police 
Department regarding “applicants’ medical history, gambling habits and alcohol con-
sumption”). 
111 Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98, 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a resident’s privacy inter-
ests in his or her residence, for example a street name, was “substantially outweighed by 
the state’s compelling interest in disclosing Megan’s Law information to the relevant pub-
lic  . . . [and] individuals within the court-authorized notification zone”). 
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ings to indicate social security numbers.112  Justice Scalia might cha-
racterize several of the claims as “utter silliness.”113 
Courts nonetheless have to treat even silliness seriously in the ab-
sence of a clear statement about whether there is a constitutional in-
formational privacy right, and if so, its scope and applicable stan-
dards.  And legislatures and administrative agencies enacting useful 
policies must nonetheless operate within the fog of ambiguity and the 
risk that an assumed right with unclear standards may lead to invali-
dation.  If suits are brought even in the relatively less controversial 
context of drug background checks and financial disclosure laws, 
then governmental policies and actions in new contexts such as inves-
tigating and warning the public about a possible serial HIV spread-
er114 may be chilled by the vague possible constitutional right of in-
formational privacy and its uncertain scope. 
After all, in the confusion after Whalen and Nixon, a district court 
even enjoined the Department of Defense (“DOD”) and the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) from adminis-
tering questionnaires asking about illegal drug use and financial his-
tory, among other issues, to employees in positions of public trust in 
order to protect against the risk of misconduct.115  The questionnaire 
vetted people in sensitive positions “involving policymaking, major 
program responsibility, law enforcement duties, or other duties de-
manding the highest degree of public trust; and positions involving 
access to or operation or control of unclassified confidential or fi-
nancial records, with a relatively high risk for causing grave damage 
or realizing a significant personal gain.”116 
 
112 See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (agreeing that “indiscriminate public 
disclosure of [Social Security Numbers] . . . may implicate the constitutional right to in-
formational privacy”). 
113 See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 769 (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing claims by 
NASA government contractors trying to avoid a background screen for drug testing and 
treatment based on a claimed constitutional right to information privacy as “utter silli-
ness” and “[r]idiculous”). 
114 Cf. Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 531, 531–32 (2011) (proposing preventative privacy-piercing for repeat STD 
spreaders to enable better-informed consent to sex when need outweighs privacy con-
cerns); Jeffrey D. Klausner et al., Tracing a Syphilis Outbreak Through Cyberspace, 284 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 447 (2000) (discussing the challenges of investigating and alerting the public 
to a potential chatroom user linked to an outbreak of several syphilis and HIV cases). 
115 Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Perry, 944 F. Supp. 958 (D.D.C. 1996); Am. 
Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 924 F. Supp. 225 
(D.D.C. 1996), rev’d, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
116 Designation of Public Trust Positions and Investigative Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 398 
(Jan. 5, 1996) (codified at 5 C.F.R. § 731.302 (1996)). 
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Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit reversed the order enjoining the DOD 
and HUD from conducting basic checks on appointees to such sensi-
tive positions of public trust.  The D.C. Circuit began its “analysis by 
expressing [its] . . . grave doubts as to the existence of a constitution-
al right of privacy in the nondisclosure of personal information.”117  
The Court would have preferred simply to make clear that such a 
right did not exist, but was inhibited from doing so by the “recurring 
dicta” by the Supreme Court, which the D.C. Circuit surmised ad-
dressed the issue without resolving it.118  Remarkably, Whalen and Nix-
on were not only unclear as to whether the right existed, but also 
whether it was recognizing the right or just assuming it. 
The D.C. Circuit quoted at length and approvingly from the deci-
sion of the Sixth Circuit, which also expressed doubt that any such 
right existed and was troubled by the ramifications if the judiciary 
were to breathe life into such a notion as a constitutional matter.  
The Sixth Circuit in J.P. v. DeSanti, a case oft-cited in the informa-
tional privacy jurisprudence, opined: 
Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to 
some degree . . . . Courts called upon to balance virtually every govern-
ment action against the corresponding intrusion on individual privacy 
may be able to give all privacy interests only cursory protection.  The 
Framers rejected a provision in the Constitution under which the Su-
preme Court would have reviewed all legislation for its constitutionality.  
They cannot have intended that the federal courts become involved in an 
inquiry nearly as broad—balancing almost every act of government, both 
state and federal, against its intrusion on a concept so vague, undefina-
ble, and all-encompassing as individual privacy. 
Inferring very broad “constitutional” rights where the Constitution itself 
does not express them is an activity not appropriate to the judiciary.  In 
this context, we note that of the cases cited holding that there is a consti-
tutional right to nondisclosure of private information, none cites a con-
stitutional provision in support of its holding.119 
Despite expressing its misgivings and view that no such right ex-
isted, the D.C. Circuit nonetheless followed the tack of the Supreme 
Court in assuming without deciding, because even if the right existed, 
the plaintiff’s claim did not state a violation.120 
Sorting through the suits over the decades, the majority of the 
federal courts of appeals and a number of state courts have gone fur-
ther and accorded the idea of informational privacy constitutional 
 
117 AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at 791. 
118 Id.  
119 J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoted in AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at792–93). 
120 AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at 793. 
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stature.121  A constitutional right created out of fog cannot help but 
be murky in its application and in terms of what standards apply, 
however.  The guessing games that courts are forced to play regard-
ing what potential standard applies to the assumed right are some-
times downright embarrassing.  Consider, for example, the Second 
Circuit’s guessing game over the right standard: 
The nature and extent of the interest recognized in Whalen and Nixon, 
and the appropriate standard of review for alleged infringements of that 
interest, are unclear.  See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1087–91 (6th 
Cir.1981) (questioning whether Whalen and Roe created any general right 
to non-disclosure of personal information against which infringing gov-
 
121 See, e.g., Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2000) (reading 
Whalen as recognizing a privacy right against the “divulgence of highly personal informa-
tion”); Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that there is 
a constitutional right of information privacy that protects against disclosure of informa-
tion such as health records); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding 
a clearly established information nondisclosure right for the purposes of vitiating quali-
fied immunity in a suit based on employment termination for refusal to authorize an ex-
tensive background check of a teacher at state-run program for drop-outs); In re Craw-
ford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the Constitution protects an 
“individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” referred to generally by 
courts as the right to “informational privacy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); James 
v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1543–44 (11th Cir. 1991) (vitiating qualified immunity 
in a suit alleging a violation of the constitutional right to information privacy); Walls v. 
City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) (reading Whalen as recognizing that 
the constitutional right to privacy also extends to the “individual interest in avoiding dis-
closure of personal matters”); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting 
that “as of June 1983 a majority of courts considering the question had concluded that a 
constitutional right of confidentiality is implicated by disclosure of a broad range of per-
sonal information, [though] courts were not unanimous in that view”); Mangels v. Pena, 
789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986) (reading Whalen and Nixon to signify that there is an 
information privacy right protected by strict scrutiny); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 
1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that most courts “appear to agree that privacy of per-
sonal matters is a protected interest . . . and that some form of intermediate scrutiny or 
balancing approach is appropriate as the standard of review” and applying such interme-
diate scrutiny to a financial disclosure requirement for government employees), cert. de-
nied 464 U.S. 1017 (1983); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132–34 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(indicating the Court has recognized another strand of the right to privacy, “the individ-
ual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,” albeit remaining unclear as to the 
standard that applies to the right (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Paternity of 
K.D., 929 N.E.2d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (reading Whalen as signifying that the Su-
preme Court has “recognized a constitutional right to information privacy under the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . though its contours continue to be refined” (internal cita-
tions omitted)).  But see, e.g., AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at 793 (expressing doubt about a general 
constitutional protection for nondisclosure, though assuming without reaching a conclu-
sion); Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that to violate 
the constitutional right of privacy based on disclosure “the information disclosed must be 
either a shocking degradation or an egregious humiliation . . . or a flagrant breech of a 
pledge of confidentiality”); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (express-
ing doubt about “very broad constitutional” protections against the disclosure of confi-
dential information (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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ernment actions have to be balanced).  Most courts considering the ques-
tion, however, appear to agree that privacy of personal matters is a pro-
tected interest . . . and that some form of intermediate scrutiny or balanc-
ing approach is appropriate as a standard of review . . . . The Supreme 
Court itself appeared to use a balancing test in Nixon . . . . Moreover, an 
intermediate standard of review seems in keeping both with the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to recognize new fundamental interests requiring a 
high degree of scrutiny for alleged infringements, and the Court’s rec-
ognition that some form of scrutiny beyond rational relation is necessary 
to safeguard the confidentiality interest.122 
It hardly becomes the dignity of an appellate court to have to say 
maybe it is intermediate scrutiny, maybe it is balancing, maybe strict 
scrutiny (though unlikely) and maybe rational relation (though 
probably more).  A “law” hardly merits the honorary appellation if 
courts must first guess at whether it exists and then feel around for 
what standard seems to apply among a menu of very different stan-
dards.  If this is true for mere law, it is all the more troubling for a 
constitutional right.  It hardly becomes the dignity of a constitutional 
right for courts to have to speculate as to whether it even exists, and 
further speculate as to what standard applies if it does. 
What is also problematic for policy innovation in the laboratories 
of the states and political branches to meet new challenges123 is that 
some courts have appeared to apply strict scrutiny, or, at least the 
language of strict scrutiny in evaluating claims.  Thus, for example, 
the Tenth Circuit in Mangels v. Pena has read Whalen to mean that the 
Due Process Clause protects against disclosure of certain personal 
matters and forbids disclosure of certain information unless it “ad-
vance[s] a compelling state interest which, in addition, must be ac-
complished in the least intrusive manner.”124  Other courts have ap-
plied a form of intermediate scrutiny or at least the language of 
intermediate scrutiny.125  Because of the mixed language in the 
Court’s cases, it is understandable why courts may, out of caution, 
migrate toward the higher standard suggested by the language to 
hedge their bets in the event their case is the one where the Court fi-
nally grants certiorari to decide whether the right exists and what 
 
122 Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559 (citations omitted). 
123 See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009) (“We have long recognized the role of 
the States as laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems.”  (citing New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
124 Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839; cf. Paul P. v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98, 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (conclud-
ing that the interest of sex offenders in keeping their addresses hidden “is substantially 
outweighed by the state’s compelling interest”). 
125 See, e.g., Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559 (concluding that Supreme Court precedent and prior 
case law support intermediate scrutiny). 
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standard applies.  Yet, beyond being a wish of Justice Brennan in a 
concurrence in Whalen and suggestive flourishes in his opinion for 
the majority in Nixon, strict or even intermediate scrutiny does not 
find much support in the dicta on which the assumed right and its 
hypothetical standard are founded.  As the Sixth Circuit observed, all 
sorts of regulations to further the community interest may arguably 
affect privacy interests.  To suggest the threat of strict or intermediate 
scrutiny is to chill policy innovation.  Moreover, civil libertarians who 
want strong protection for privacy may have cause to be concerned 
that heightened scrutiny leads to potential front-end deterrence in 
recognizing privacy interests lest the tough scrutiny apply.  This dilu-
tion would impact not only judicial recognition but the politics of 
recognition in the legislative arena, where protections are best cali-
brated and crafted. 
I have written elsewhere about some of the dialogue-inducing and 
deliberation-triggering virtues of standards that have blurry bounda-
ries to give political actors incentive to evaluate whether their actions 
fit within the scope of the standards.126  A standard with blurry boun-
daries for a clear right such as the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment is far different, however, than 
a quasi-constitutional law of assumed rights with no clear standard.  It 
is salutary, particularly in certain sensitive gray areas where legislative 
actions push against the scope of constitutional safeguards, to have 
legislatures deliberate over whether the actions cross the line in view 
of a standard.  It is innovation-chilling and unprincipled, however, to 
simply have courts guess at whether a right exists or not—even some-
times abrogating qualified immunity to vindicate the assumed right—
and further guess or pick what standards might apply. 
Such a quasi-constitutional law of assumptions without defined 
standards casts the courts adrift to try to discern whether there may 
be violations of a hypothetical right.  Lower courts have observed, 
it is not clear from Whalen whether, to be constitutionally protected by a 
right of nondisclosure, personal information must concern an area of life 
itself protected by either the autonomy branch of the right of privacy or 
by other fundamental rights or whether, to the contrary, the right of con-
fidentiality protects a broader array of information than that implicated 
by the autonomy branch of the right of privacy.127  
The result may be that while we cannot define the right, or what it 
covers, or the standard, or what a violation would be, we sometimes 
 
126 See Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice:  The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
101 (forthcoming 2012) (exploring the utility of uncertainty). 
127 Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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know it when we see it because it feels wrong and we want to provide 
protection and give a remedy. 
The result is a puzzling mishmash jurisprudence.  Our medical 
and disease information feels deeply private and is usually protected, 
requiring interest-balancing or maybe even passing intermediate or 
strict scrutiny before disclosure128—unless one is a prisoner.  Disclo-
sure of a prison inmate’s HIV status or the contents of a psychological 
evaluation may or may not implicate the constitutional right to in-
formational privacy129—but we are surer the right applies and is vi-
olated when we think corrections officers are being irresponsible 
jerks about it.130  Revealing to the public details disclosed in the 
course of an investigation is not a violation of the constitutional right 
to informational privacy131—except sometimes, particularly if we think 
 
128 See, e.g., Norman–Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 
1998) (holding there is a protected informational privacy interest in test results related to 
syphilis, pregnancy and the sickle cell trait); Doe v. Att’y Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 
1991) (holding there is a protected informational privacy interest in HIV/AIDS test re-
sults); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(“There can be no question that an employee’s medical records, which may contain inti-
mate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy 
protection.”); see also Anita L. Allen, Confidentiality:  An Expectation in Health Care, in PENN 
CENTER GUIDE TO BIOETHICS 127, 128 (Vardit Ravitsky et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the 
deeply held feeling among the polity that medical information should be private). 
129 See, e.g., Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 1995) (expressing doubt about 
whether seropositive inmates have constitutional privacy rights that protect against the 
disclosure of their medical records or information as part of prison safety screenings); 
Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the disclosure of a pris-
on inmate’s HIV-positive status does not violate a constitutional right to privacy).  Compare 
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 (11th Cir. 1991) (assuming “arguendo that seropo-
sitive prisoners enjoy some significant constitutionally-protected privacy interest in pre-
venting the non-consensual disclosure of their HIV-positive diagnoses”) with Dean v. 
Roane Gen. Hosp., 578 F. Supp. 408, 409 (S.D. W. Va. 1984) (holding that a sheriff’s dis-
closure of a prisoner’s medical records indicating his diabetic condition did not violate a 
constitutional right to privacy). 
130 See, e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112–13 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that “gratuitous 
disclosure of an inmate’s confidential medical information as humor or gossip—the ap-
parent circumstance of the disclosure in this case—is not reasonably related to a legiti-
mate penological interest, and it therefore violates the inmate’s constitutional right to 
privacy” though the right was not clearly established enough at the time to vitiate quali-
fied immunity). 
131 See, e.g., Bailey v. City of Port Huron, 507 F.3d 364, 365–66, 369 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding 
“there is no constitutional right to privacy for a criminal suspect who claims that ‘the 
State may not publicize a record of an official act’” and thus there was no privacy violation 
where personal information of an undercover deputy sheriff and his wife was released to 
the public in the course of an investigation into a drunken driving accident (quoting Paul 
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976))); Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 206 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (finding there is no constitutionally protected privacy interest in information 
disclosed in police report); Olivera v. Vizzusi, No. CIV. 2:10-1747 WBS GGH, 2011 WL 
1253887, at *1, *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011) (holding police officers have no rights to 
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the police are behaving badly.132  This jurisprudence of constitutional 
intuitions is so steered by the feels-wrong approach, that the Sixth 
Circuit, the biggest hold-out in recognizing the assumed constitu-
tional right of informational privacy,133 has, nonetheless recognized a 
violation based on disclosure—albeit characterized as a violation of a 
“fundamental right of privacy”—in a case of disclosure of details of a 
rape disclosed to police.134  Even though the Sixth Circuit had pre-
viously held that disclosure of details given to police in the course of 
an investigation does not implicate a privacy right, the court was quite 
evidently offended by the facts of the case, wherein a sheriff allegedly 
disclosed humiliating facts of the rape to the public after the victim 
criticized his investigation.135 
In the absence of law and defined standards, a constitutional juri-
sprudence of intuitions has arisen in the lower courts.  The Eighth 
Circuit’s standard is perhaps the most open about the affectively in-
fluenced unconstitutional-if-it-feels-wrong test.  The Eighth Circuit 
has held that “‘the information disclosed must be either a shocking 
degradation or an egregious humiliation . . . or a flagrant breach of a 
pledge of confidentiality’” to violate the constitutional right of priva-
cy.136  The Eighth Circuit has also openly identified the affectively in-
fluenced intuition that helped give rise to the potential constitutional 
right to informational privacy.  The Eighth Circuit explained in Eagle 
v. Morgan, “the Supreme Court foresaw on the horizon abuses that 
might emanate from governmental collection of vast amounts of per-
sonal data . . . . We echo these concerns.  It is disquieting to think 
that [the governmental actors engaged in the actions alleged in the 
case].”137  The quasi-constitutional law of informational privacy that 
has arisen is a shadow constitutional law of intuitions founded on the 
 
information privacy in information uncovered in an investigation into their potential 
misconduct); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (declining to enlarge the no-
tion of constitutionally protected privacy to prevent police from publicizing the “record 
of an official act such as an arrest”); Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 100–01, 105–07 (2d Cir. 
1984) (holding that the leak of grand jury information to the press by a prosecutor was 
not actionable because the release of stigmatizing information does not establish a due 
process claim). 
132 See, e.g., Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 686–87 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a potential constitu-
tional violation of the right to privacy but not of a clearly established right sufficient to vi-
tiate qualified immunity, though warning “public officials in this circuit will now be on 
notice that such a privacy right exists”). 
133 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
134 Bloch, 156 F.3d at 686. 
135 Id. at 676. 
136 Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 
1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993)) (alteration in original). 
137 Id. at 627. 
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sensation of disquiet over possible governmental overreaching amid 
social change.138 
Intuition is a double-edged sword in steering our judgments.  A 
new wave of social psychology has shed insights on how intuition and 
affect subtly steer our perception, judgment, and decision making.139  
Intuition can be a powerful guide to steering judgment, because it 
incorporates the insights of experience that may be hard to translate 
into words.140  Indeed studies have indicated that the calls of nurses 
on impending heart failure, or chess masters on the right move, or 
ball players are better when steered by intuition and instinct and may 
be hard to reduce to words or even marred when an explanation is 
required.141  But intuitions, and the emotions that affect them, can al-
so lead us astray.  Intuitions are shaded by what Melissa Finucane, El-
len Peters, and Paul Slovic have dubbed “the affect heuristic,” the 
idea that our judgment of a situation is impacted by our emotional 
reaction to it, or at a level of reaction even before emotion, the gen-
eral sense of goodness or badness about it.142  Moral intuitions also 
suffer from the general problems with heuristics and biases—
cognitive rules of thumb that may lead us astray.  Jonathan Baron has 
analyzed how overvaluation of the status quo—and greater demands 
for justification when the status quo is changed, termed status quo bi-
 
138 See also, Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 194–95 (4th Cir. 1990) (“In the past few 
decades, technological advances have provided society with the ability to collect, store, 
organize, and recall vast amounts of information about individuals in sophisticated com-
puter files.  This database capability is already being extensively used by the government, 
financial institutions, and marketing research firms to track our travels, interests, prefe-
rences, habits, and associates.  Although some of this information can be useful and even 
necessary to maintain order and provide communication and convenience in a complex 
society, we need to be ever diligent to guard against misuse.  Some information still needs 
to be private, disclosed to the public only if the person voluntarily chooses to disclose 
it.”). 
139 See, e.g., Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, Judgment and Decision Making:  The 
Dance of Affect and Reason, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION 
RESEARCH 327, 327–29 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003) (setting forth 
a theory on the role of affect in judgment and decision making that is supported with 
empirical research). 
140 Preface to INTUITION IN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING ix (Henning Plessner et al. eds., 
2008). 
141 See generally ROBIN M. HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION (2001) (collecting such studies); 
Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:  Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1449, 1449–50 (2003) (same); Markus Raab & Joseph G. Johnson, Implicit 
Learning as a Means to Intuitive Decision Making in Sports, in INTUITION IN JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING supra note 140 (analyzing the phenomenon in the context of sports); 
see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK:  THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 13, 29, 
39 (2005) (describing the process as rapid cognition and offering myriad examples). 
142 Finucane et al., supra note 139, at 340–41. 
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as—can impact people’s moral decisions in potentially irrational 
ways.143  Baron has accordingly warned against reliance on moral in-
tuitions to guide us to the right result.144  If moral intuitions are not 
the “royal road to moral truth”145 they cannot be the foundation for 
creating a broad amorphous constitutional right, at least unclothed 
in colorable constitutional text. 
III.  PRIVACY’S LENS:  SEEING THE SUPPLE TEXT WE HAVE, NOT 
INVENTING ANEW 
Whither forward?  After thirty-three years of letting the constitu-
tional right of informational privacy live a vigorous life by assumption 
in the lower courts, the Supreme Court recently decided again not to 
decide whether the right exists in NASA v. Nelson.146  Noting the gov-
ernment had not asked the Court to find there is no constitutional 
right to informational privacy, the Court declined to consider the 
question, instead following the approach of Whalen and Nixon of as-
suming without deciding that the right existed to dispose of a claim.147  
The Court therefore declined to render legitimate (or not) the juri-
sprudence of quasi-constitutional law based on assumption. 
Despite the odd posture of fleshing out and clarifying the appli-
cable standard (for a potentially nonexistent right), NASA v. Nelson 
did help introduce some more clarity to the standard that should ap-
ply if the right exists.  The Court noted:  “We reject the argument 
that the Government, when it requests job-related personal informa-
tion in an employment background check, has a constitutional bur-
den to demonstrate that its questions are ‘necessary’ or the least re-
strictive means of furthering its interests.”148  The Court thus defused 
Justice Brennan’s planting of the strict scrutiny possibility in his Wha-
len concurrence and in some of the suggestive language in his majori-
ty opinion in Nixon.149 
In doing so, the Nelson court ameliorated but did not altogether 
cure the potential for chilling policy innovations in the laboratories 
 
143 See generally JONATHAN BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED:  INTUITION AND ERROR IN PUBLIC 
DECISION MAKING (1998) (discussing myriad examples of the impact of status quo bias); 
see also Jonathan Haidt & Selin Kesebir, In the Forest of Value:  Why Moral Intuitions Are Dif-
ferent, in INTUITION IN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING supra note 140, at 210 (collecting 
studies). 
144 Baron, supra note 18, at 39–40. 
145 Id. at 38. 
146 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 & n.10 (2011). 
147 Id. at 756 n.10. 
148 Id. at 760. 
149 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text and references. 
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of the states and political branches.  Taking the prospect of strict 
scrutiny out of the picture, at least in the background check context, 
is salutary.  But the substantial ambiguity over the scope and contours 
of the standard remain a significant chilling factor.  As Justice Scalia 
argued, the Court’s context-specific analysis of a claim that, at any 
rate, was “utter silliness” leaves ample room for distinguishing any 
limits.150  What if at issue is not background checks but a carefully ca-
librated program of disease control and information-sharing with sa-
feguards, for example? 
In playing on the theme of Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Whalen, 
which characterizes the interest in informational privacy as a hypo-
thetical constitutional right, I do not mean to undervalue it.  I believe 
that Justice Scalia’s vigorous arguments that the Court has the duty to 
say what the law is on this important issue are compelling and con-
vincing.  I have made two more arguments in favor of correcting the 
murk of indecision, the first based on how indecision and ambiguity 
chills policy innovation in the laboratories of the states and political 
branches and the second based on the need to enunciate a standard 
by which courts can consistently and coherently sort the cases and 
translate intuition into law.151  But Justice Scalia also believes that we 
should leave informational privacy to the political branches to cali-
brate.152  In Justice Scalia’s view, there is no right to informational pri-
vacy, period, so courts should stop sounding off. 
In contrast, I argue that the idea of informational privacy has a 
constitutional role to play and is not merely a good idea for the polit-
ical branches to implement alone.  As Anita Allen has illuminated, 
privacy is more than a popular preference but a “foundational good 
to which liberal societies must have a substantive commitment, as 
they do to freedom and equality.”153  This Article has argued that the 
protean idea of privacy is a lens that helps bring into focus the mean-
ing of the supple text of the Constitution.  As a constitutional con-
cept, privacy suffers from the frequent charge that it is an atextual in-
vention.  I believe the course of privacy’s career in constitutional law 
 
150 Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 769 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
151 See discussion supra at notes 108–45. 
152 Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 765 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would simply hold that there is no 
constitutional right to ‘informational privacy.’  Besides being consistent with constitu-
tional text and tradition, this view has the attractive benefit of resolving this case without 
resort to the Court’s exegesis on the Government’s legitimate interest in identifying con-
tractor drug abusers and the comfortingly narrow scope of NASA’s ‘routine use’ regula-
tions.”). 
153 Anita L. Allen, Unpopular Privacy:  The Case for Government Mandates, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 87, 93 (2007). 
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has shown it not to be a standalone atextual invention, but rather a 
concept that helps enrich our understanding of the freedoms expli-
citly safeguarded in the Constitution.154 
The provenance of privacy in constitutional law has been a matter 
of embarrassment, sometimes elided or only alluded to in the way po-
lite company referred to illegitimacy in the days of old.  But the em-
barrassment of privacy in constitutional law arises only if it is re-
garded as a separate stand-alone right lacking a textual anchor.  In 
contrast, the course of privacy’s career in constitutional law indicates 
it is a concept rich with meaning that lubricates and keeps supple our 
understanding of the terms and ideas enshrined in the Constitution.  
There is no need to invent; the Constitution’s terms are supple 
enough, if only we are able to see them.  Privacy describes interests 
and harms that open up our vision so we can better implement and 
vindicate the Constitution’s freedoms and protections as social con-
texts change. 
The standards that apply to the manifold and myriad contexts 
lumped for adjudication under the hypothetical right of informa-
tional privacy depend, therefore, on the particular transgression al-
leged.  Take, for example, the cases where state actors egregiously 
and aggressively out someone’s disease status.  In Doe v. Borough of 
Barrington, for example, police officers learned about the HIV-
positive status of the plaintiff’s husband during a traffic stop when he 
warned them not to touch him because he had HIV and “weeping le-
sions.”155  The defendant officer Smith told the plaintiff Does’ neigh-
bors, the DiAngelos, about Mr. Doe’s HIV status, and told Mrs. DiAn-
gelo that she should use disinfectant to protect herself.156  Mrs. 
DiAngelo, a school district employee who had children in school with 
the Doe children, became upset and contacted the media and other 
parents, some of whom withdrew their children from school rather 
than allowing them to be educated alongside the Doe children.157  
The District of New Jersey vitiated qualified immunity and allowed a 
civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to proceed on the theory that 
the officer’s disclosure violated the privacy rights of Mr. Doe and his 
family.158  In characterizing this case as one about the constitutional 
 
154 In this regard, the First Circuit in Borucki v. Ryan aptly traced the constitutional right to 
information privacy to “the autonomy branch of the privacy right.”  827 F.2d 836, 841 n.8 
(1st Cir. 1987).  As I argued in Part I, the “autonomy branch of the privacy right” is in 
turn about enriching our understanding of the meaning of liberty.  See supra Part I.B. 
155 729 F. Supp. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1990). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 378–79. 
158 Id. at 382. 
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right to informational privacy, the court remarkably held that a right 
not yet even definitively held to exist is clearly established. 
Our intuitions tell us in these cases that surely there should be 
some protection against such disturbing governmental conduct in the 
Constitution and a remedy.  The question is how to translate intui-
tions of justice into respectable law.  The answer is that the Due 
Process Clause and its jurisprudence on informational branding sup-
plies an answer—or at least safeguards to curb such official miscon-
duct. 
Part of the unease with how much information the State can dis-
close may be concern over the amplified voice and authority of the 
State.159  In many circumstances, the State does not merely disclose 
information; it brands individuals with a mark of disgrace.  Informa-
tional branding by the State has a long history, both literary and ac-
tual.  It is not categorically unconstitutional.  Indeed, sometimes such 
information disclosure may serve important social interests.  But the 
Court has long held that some process is due before “such a stigma or 
badge of disgrace” may be affixed by the State.160 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau is illu-
strative.  At issue in Constantineau was a remarkable form of commu-
nity policing to deal with the social ills and externalities wreaked by 
someone who “by excessive drinking of intoxicating liquors, or fer-
mented malt beverages . . . expose[s] himself or family to want,” or 
imposes on the community the burden of supporting him or his fami-
ly, or endangers the safety and health of himself or others.161  Under 
the Wisconsin law, “the wife of such person” and other officials, in-
cluding the Chief of Police or the District Attorney, “may, in writing 
signed by her, him or them, forbid all persons knowingly to sell or 
give away to such person any intoxicating liquors or fermented malt 
beverages, for the space of one year.”162  In Constantineau’s case, the 
Hartford Chief of Police ordered the dissemination of notices to all 
Hartford retail liquor outlets forbidding sale of liquor to him without 
prior notice or hearing where he had an opportunity to be heard.163 
The question was what process is due before the State attaches 
“such a stigma or badge of disgrace.”164  The Court ruled: 
 
159 I thank Jason Schulz for raising this concern at a workshop. 
160 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971). 
161 Id. at 434 n.2 (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. §176.26 (West 1967)). 
162 Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 434 n.2 (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 176.26 (West 1967)). 
163 Id. at 435. 
164 Id. at 436. 
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Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake 
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard are essential.  “Posting” under the Wisconsin Act may to 
some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is a stigma, an official 
branding of a person.  The label is a degrading one.  Under the Wiscon-
sin Act, a resident of Hartford is given no process at all.  This appellee 
was not afforded a chance to defend herself.  She may have been the vic-
tim of an official’s caprice.  Only when the whole proceedings leading to 
the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive re-
sults be prevented.165 
No justice thought a naked delegation of power to “a man’s wife [and 
other minor officers]”166 to so shame him and restrict his liberty with-
out prior notice and hearing was constitutional on its face.  The three 
dissenting justices mainly wanted to afford state courts an opportuni-
ty to first construe the statute and perhaps narrow it.167  Justice Black, 
joined by Justice Blackmun, underscored the sentiment of the Court 
deploring the grant of “such arbitrary and tyrannical power in the 
hands of minor officers and others” and likened it to a bill of attaind-
er that “can be issued ex parte, without notice or hearing of any kind 
or character.”168  He dissented because he wanted to give the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court the first shot at invalidating the statute, explain-
ing, “[i]t is impossible for me to believe that the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin would uphold any such boundless power over the lives and 
liberties of its citizens.”169 
As for the HIV-outing cases in the prison inmate contexts, as the 
Seventh Circuit has suggested, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment would prevent prison officials from 
“disseminat[ing] humiliating but penologically irrelevant details of a 
prisoner’s medical history.”170  Indeed, in one such case of “gratuitous 
 
165 Id. at 437.  Interestingly, in this vein, the Whalen Court cited Judge Skelly Wright’s opi-
nion in Utz v. Cullinane, wherein Judge Wright observed:  “Due process obligates the gov-
ernment to accord an individual the opportunity to disprove potentially damaging allega-
tions before it disseminates information that might be used to his detriment.”  520 F.2d 
467, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (cited in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 n.34 (1977)). 
166  Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 444. 
167 See Constantineau, 400 U.S.. at 440 (Burger, J., dissenting) (predicating the dissent on the 
possibility that the Wisconsin courts, which had not yet ruled on the validity of the statute 
at issue, could find that the statute violates the state constitution, thus eliminating the 
need to rule on the issue of federal constitutionality); id. at 443–44 (Black, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that where the state court might confine the state law’s meaning so as not to 
have any constitutional infirmity, the case should be remanded with directions to with-
hold court proceedings to enable appellee to file a state court action challenging the va-
lidity of the statute). 
168 Id. at 444. 
169 Id. 
170 Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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disclosure of an inmate’s confidential medication information”—that 
she was an HIV-positive transsexual—for “humor or gossip,” the 
Second Circuit found an informational privacy violation, but it was 
the Eighth Amendment that did the remedial work.171  The Second 
Circuit explained that the right to confidentiality in medical informa-
tion varies with condition but is at its zenith when it comes to HIV sta-
tus and secret transsexualism.172 
The choice to allow others to know of one’s disease status and 
sexual identity is a choice one makes for oneself, not a decision that 
the State makes for us, the Second Circuit reasoned.173  The Second 
Circuit distinguished this right of “confidentiality” from “the right to 
autonomy and independence in decision making for personal mat-
ters.”174  But the root interest—why the law should care—is about the 
denial of the basic liberty of intimate decision making.  Ultimately, 
the Second Circuit recognized a right to the confidentiality of medi-
cal information but held the right was not sufficiently “clearly estab-
lished” to vitiate qualified immunity.175  But the Second Circuit con-
cluded that under certain circumstances, the state’s outing of an HIV-
positive prisoner—particularly accompanied by the outing of trans-
sexualism—put the prisoner at substantial risk of harm, thereby vi-
olating clearly established Eighth Amendment law and overriding 
qualified immunity.176  The Second Circuit based its Eighth Amend-
ment holding on the risk of violence by other inmates due to the dis-
closure.177  The informational privacy lens also magnifies other as-
pects of the harm based on the daily humiliation, ridicule, and 
harassment even short of serious physical injury by stripping Devilla 
of the basic autonomy to decide whether and to whom she would re-
veal her transsexualism and HIV status.  The informational privacy 
lens also helps magnify the risk as sufficient to constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment even before the harm of serious physical injury 
occurs.  We need not invent new rights to vindicate our sense of jus-
tice. 
 
171 Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1999). 
172 Id. at 111. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
175 Id. at 114. 
176 See id. at 114–15 (explaining that the pre-existing law made it sufficiently clear that the 
Eighth Amendment barred prison officials from disclosing an inmate’s transsexualism in 
certain situations where it could be reasonably foreseen that such disclosure would sub-
ject the plaintiff to inmate-on-inmate violence). 
177 Id. at 115. 
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What about intrusive background checks, or indiscriminate disclo-
sure of medical information, or financial disclosure laws?  Some of 
the lower courts have indicated that the assumed right of constitu-
tional privacy is implicated by such laws—but they have passed muster 
under even heightened intermediate scrutiny given the nature of the 
privacy interest on the one hand and the often important public in-
terest on the other.178  In these domains, populist privacy can do far 
more than the Court in calibrating the right balance.  But where the 
political branches disturb the status quo balance of power in terms of 
what we may hold secret from the State sufficiently to present issues 
implicating liberty, then due process balancing of interests would be 
implicated.  Here, again, informational privacy is a lens to help us see 
how information is power, and how certain liberty-invasive forms of 
mandated disclosure may disrupt the balance of power and thereby 
warrant due process interest-balancing. 
 
178 See, e.g., Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 532, 539 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that even as-
suming a prison inmate about to be released has a right to privacy of medical informa-
tion, disclosure of medical information obtained for civil commitment purposes does not 
violate any such right); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 948–49, 956–58 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a mandate which required teachers at a state-run, federally-funded program 
for high school drop-outs to release medical records for background check violated stu-
dents’ right of confidentiality, although granting qualified immunity to director for re-
quired authorization for release of financial records); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 
F.2d 188, 189–90, 192–94 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that background check questionnaire 
for city police department employee contained questions that implicated the privacy in-
terest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, but allowing the policy to pass muster 
because the city had a compelling interest in checking its police and had exercised suffi-
cient caution to prevent disclosure); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1556, 1559, 
1564 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that financial disclosure laws affecting city employees mak-
ing $25,000 or more passed intermediate scrutiny in light of the city’s interests in prevent-
ing corruption and conflicts of interest); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 
F.2d 570, 572, 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that while mandated disclosure of medi-
cal records to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health implicated consti-
tutional privacy interests, such mandate passed muster under the balancing test); Plante 
v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1121–22, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978) (balancing interests and ruling 
that financial disclosure laws for state senators pass muster).  But see, e.g., Lee v. City of 
Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 248, 261 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that sick leave procedure that 
required city employees to state nature of illness to supervisors did not implicate any in-
formational privacy right recognized by the Sixth Circuit); Fraternal Order of Police, 
Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 107, 112–18 (3d Cir. 1987) (balancing 
interests and ruling that background questionnaire for Special Investigations police ap-
plicants that asked intrusive intimate questions without data protections may unconstitu-
tionally impinge on the applicant’s privacy interest under an interest-balancing test). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Constitution’s text is robust and supple enough to capture 
the most concerning harms that arouse our intuitive sense of wrong 
that the lower courts have been cramming into the assumed constitu-
tional right of informational privacy.  There is no need to persist in a 
jurisprudence of assumption for fear that the pressures of advances in 
technology and other new social challenges have exposed gaps that 
we need to fix through a secondary structure of a quasi-constitutional 
law of posturing. 
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,” the Court 
has penned eloquently, in another context where privacy had laid the 
groundwork for a richer understanding of liberty, and then slipped 
off-stage once an enriched vision of liberty could come to the fore.179  
It is time to dispel the doubt and allow a richer vision of the mean-
ings of constitutional freedoms to come to the fore, brought into fo-
cus by the lens of informational privacy, not as an invented right, but 
as a way to see how supple and well-suited for governing through so-
cial change the Constitution’s text is. 
 
179 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
